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STRAW POLLS
Daniel B. Rodriguez*
A key measure of the democratic quality of a political community is how its members vote. The
design and implementation of voting arrangements can illuminate the nature, purposes, and even
potential of a community of citizens. Whatever other values are attached by commentators to the
activity of voting,1 voting is, at the very least, used to sort out and implement preferences. Voting
processes help in sorting out winners from losers and thereby provide a presumptively fair method for
the implementation of public policy. At the same time, voting in a democratic policy is a coercive act.
Voters are not merely expressing preferences; they are acting in order to transform their preferences
into policy. How ought we to think about this coercive aspect of voting? The subject of my essay is one
narrow aspect of this larger puzzle, that is, the consideration of a particular voting device--the straw
poll--and its potential impact upon democratic decision-making.
The puzzle of voting as a democratic method of deciding in political communities that interests
me here is this: How much difference does it make, and ought it to make, whether voters who make
their views known in a particular decision-making episode know of the preferences of others? Of
course, decision-making in light of other's preferences is a critical piece of game theory2 and rational
choice theories of politics more generally.3 And from a practical political standpoint, the
interdependence of decision-makers' preferences is a ubiquitous feature of politics, affecting logrolling,
negotiations, and various aspects of political strategy. My basic normative claim is that to the extent that
a political community ought to value the preferences, thoughts, and ideas of others, it ought to reflect
upon community members' preferences before finally deciding. In discussions of participatory
democracy, this other-regardingness is usually dealt with by some sort of "deliberation." Another way-more mechanical, but more realistic as a component of a decision-making process--is through the
mechanism of a straw poll.
I.
To understand the nature of the issues raised, let me describe in some detail a couple of episodes:
In my third year of law school, I took a class in Local Government Law. At a point late in the semester,
a student proposed to the instructor that we ought to take action in strong solidarity with the students at

*

Professor of Law and Dean, University of San Diego School of Law. Thanks to the participants in the
"illiberal communities" conference for helpful comments on these ideas and especially to Maimon Schwarzschild and
Jeremy Waldron for illuminating discussions which, perhaps unbenownst to them, helped shape some of the ideas
therein. This essay in dedicated to my late colleague, Professor Paul Wohlmuth, who was just the sort of colleague
who appreciates the give-and-take on democracy and decision-making which this essay seeks to capture.
1

See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 330 (1993).
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See, e.g., Norman Schofield, Coalition Politics: A Formal Model and Empirical Analysis, 7(3) Journal of
Theoretical Politics 245 (1995); John Harsanyi, Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and
Conformist Theories, 21 World Politics 513 (1969).
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See, e.g., David Baron & John Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1181 (1989).

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art28

2

Rodriguez:

the University who were protesting apartheid in South Africa and demanding the University to divest
itself of investments in that country. As one form of protest, instructors were urged to move their classes
to hastily assembled versions of South African shantytowns, actually large cardboard boxes shaped into
faux classrooms and labeled "the open university." The instructor of our class decided to throw this
option to the students and asked that we deliberate on this matter and then vote on whether we ought to
move the class. A "rights" claim was made, that is, the insistence that students have a right to have their
class conducted at the law school; there emerged little sympathy for this claim, however, and the class
then proceeded to deliberate on the merits of the request. Before the final vote was taken, one student
observed that she was truly torn as to the right outcome; the student felt strongly that the class ought to
be moved and she was, therefore, inclined to vote to move to the shantytown. On the other hand, this
student worried about the interests of those who disagreed with her decision. Although the students
who held different views had not persuaded her that she was wrong in her beliefs, the fact of
disagreement and the breadth of this disagreement gave her pause. She requested that a straw poll be
conducted, followed by additional time for conversation and reflection.
Episode number two: The law school at which I taught before coming to San Diego had an
unusual rule for faculty decision-making with regard to candidates for the regular faculty. It was as
follows: After suitable discussion, the faculty would vote on the question whether an offer ought to be
extended to the candidate. If the candidate received "yes" votes constituting more than 80% of the
regular faculty, an offer would be recommended; if he received fewer than 60% support, no offer
would be recommended. If, however, the tally was between 60% and 80%, the faculty would proceed
to discuss the question whether there was present "a substantial minority" of faculty opposed to the
making of an offer. The phrase "substantial minority" was nowhere defined in the law school faculty's
decision rules. At the end of some period of time, the faculty would vote upon the question whether a
"substantial minority" existed and, if the "yes" vote on this question was less than 50%, an offer would
be recommended.
The first example and, in particular, the student's quandary, highlight the bifurcated nature of
voting in a participatory democracy. Think of the two different types of questions raised by the class
episode:
Q1:VOTE ON THE QUESTION "DO YOU WANT TO MOVE THE CLASS?"
Q2:VOTE ON THE QUESTION "DO YOU WANT THE RESULT TO BE THAT
THE CLASS IS MOVED?"
Typically, we would think of these questions as equivalent. Indeed, we will likely vote only
once, so these questions will inevitably be merged into one another. But notice that they raise
fundamentally different issues. Q1 asks you to consider merely your own preferences on the subject.
Assuming no amount of strategic voting and assuming that you care in the slightest about the issue
raised, it is completely sensible to ask you to consider, in casting your vote, how you feel about the
underlying issue. Q2, however, introduces the factor of coercion. 4 Here, you are asked to communicate
not only a preference about the basic issue, but also a preference about whether you think that your
4

I am using "coercion" here to refer merely to the actual fact of majority will and the result that losers'
preferences will be subordinated to the will of the majority.
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will, if shared with a majority of your students, should govern. This is precisely what makes Q2
especially interesting. We need to have in mind a conception of democratic governance, that is, at least
some impression of whether coercion of the minority is appropriate under certain circumstances, before
we can answer the second question. This question is understandably central to both classical and
modern democratic theory. All I aim to suggest here is that our perspective on this question will not
necessarily be informed by our perspective on the first.
We could just see these two questions as dealing with different aspects of the exact same type
of preferences and preference ordering. From one perspective, Q1 asks about your preferences for a
particular outcome, while Q2 concerns how strongly one holds these preferences. But notice that this
assumes its own conclusion. To know whether the answer to the question "do you want the result to be
that the class is moved" reflects merely the intensity of your preferences, we need to know whether
there may be a preference to respect the views of those with whom you disagree. Maybe you really,
really want to have the class at the shantytown, but you also care greatly that your preferences will not
be enshrined into policy over the broad objections of your other community members.5 The
consideration that goes into this judgment may or may not reflect intensity of preferences; it may,
instead, reflect a view on participatory democracy and, more generally, the proper role of majoritarian
coercion.
With respect to episode number two, the issues raised here concern the ways in which
decision-makers in a collective process reach closure on the question of whether there is substantial
disagreement with the proposed policy. Of course, voting tells us, in the final analysis, whether there is
substantial dissent; we need only count the votes. However, the interesting feature of the faculty
decision-making scheme described above is that the faculty pauses and considers, in light of the first
vote, whether and to what extent there is substantial disagreement before taking the final vote. In
design, this gives an opportunity for further deliberation; yet, it also plays a role even if no additional
deliberation is forthcoming. Indeed, if we think of substantiality as something that can be measured
precisely, then we will know whether there is "substantial" dissent (and will vote accordingly in the
second vote) just as soon as the first vote is completed. If, instead, substantiality is more subjective,
then we are led back to a predicament not unlike the class move episode, that is, what should our
attitude be toward those with whom we disagree? And should this attitude affect our final vote?
The puzzle, then, I am addressing concerns the relationship between these two considerations-on the one hand, "mere preference," and, on the other, "preference to coerce." To develop the
argument in favor of caution in manifesting a preference to coerce, I would need to examine in greater
detail and with a richer political-theoretic framework, the notion of majoritarian decision-making and
what ought to go into the considerations of choice in a political community. What I want to do in the
remainder of this paper is more modest than this. I want to explore how the additional thinking about
this puzzle of voting helps us to understand the role and function of decision-making in political
communities. I also want to point to a voting mechanism that will help in keeping properly separate the
two distinct voting considerations described above.
5

Ken Binmore raises this issue, within a game-theoretic framework, in his extended discussion of
sympathetic and empathetic preferences. In this, he follows Hume in his emphasis on the importance of sympathetic
identification between human beings and its connection to some notion of rationality. See K. G. BINMORE, GAME
T HEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT --VOLUME 1: PLAYING FAIR 285-96 (1994).

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art28

4

Rodriguez:

II.
The preoccupation with mere voting in the previous discussion ignores what is often viewed as
central in discussions of democratic decision-making, namely, deliberation.6 However contested is the
notion that deliberation is a characteristic of contemporary legislative policymaking, there is a much
clearer sense that some sort of deliberation, however dysfunctional, occurs-- and needs to occur--in
small communities that make policy choices in a democratic fashion.7 To take an example close to
home, think of decision-making within academic faculties or within homeowner's associations. Where
participatory democracy reigns, we see not only voting schemes but also some space for deliberation as
part of "voice."8
Whatever other functions that deliberation performs in framing issues for choice, in fostering
feelings of inclusion, in promoting a sense of fairness, in expanding the scope of information, and in
other values noted in discussions of democratic theory, another key function of deliberation is the
elaboration of the depth and breadth of disagreement.9 The invitation for discussion is not only an
invitation for community members to join in to provide evidence, argument, and reasons to justify a
decision in one direction or another; this invitation may also call for a statement of position, as well as an
articulation of how strongly one feels about this position. While we may be inclined to characterize such
a statement as "unreasoned," as not properly part of the deliberative process, it is striking how often this
forms a part of the deliberative process in real decision-making settings. Is this so clearly evidence of
unreasoned debate? Or might this position-taking be consistent with a model of participatory
democracy in which one's preferences on a particular matter may well factor into the choice set of
another voter? In other words, the taking of a position in the context of a deliberative process may
inform the Q2 position, even if it does not shed any useful light on the issue of Q1 preference.
Let us return to our example of the "substantial minority" rule. The substantiality of dissent need
not be based on an objective assessment of whether the arguments of the dissenters have substance,
that is, are well-reasoned, based upon sufficient evidence, and the like. Indeed, our intuitive take on
substantiality would, I suggest, be that this is a mostly subjective, not objective, criterion. To be sure,
we would need to know more from the individuals who express dissent than the mere fact that they
voted "no." Otherwise, the inquiry in the second round will be perfectly symmetrical with the first and,
6

Lynn Baker defines deliberation thusly: "[T]hat decisions be motivated by a concern with 'the public
good'; that they be explicitly justified by appeals to 'the public good'; and that the goal of deliberation be agreement
among the decision-makers."). Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective,
67 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 707, 738 (1992). A proceduralist rendering is given by Joshua Cohen. He defines deliberation as a
process whereby participants "regard one another as equals; they aim to defend and criticize institutions and
programs in terms of considerations that others have reason to accept, given... that those others are reasonable; and
they are prepared to cooperate in accordance with the results of such discussion." Joshua Cohen, Procedure and
Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE (S. Benhabib ed. 1996).
7

See the discussion in Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 666-68 (2001).

8

See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT , VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSE TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS , AND
STATES (1972).
9

See the discussion in John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS 75, 79-82 (I. Shapiro & S. Macedo eds., 2000).
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therefore, no deliberation would be necessary. It would suffice to simply proceed with the second vote
immediately. Instead, this peculiar voting rule works only if there is added deliberation between the first
and second round of voting, albeit deliberation which goes to the question of whether there are
substantial objections, presumably reflected in the views of a substantial numbers of persons. The
reasons advanced for these objections go to substantiality and concern directly the Q2 inquiry noted
above; they are less likely to go to the Q1 question. It is highly unlikely, in other words, that one's
preference as to a particular faculty candidate will be altered by the declaration of a colleague after the
first vote that they have substantial objections to an offer being made.
I do not want to be entirely pollyannaish, however, about the reality of deliberation under the
scheme just described. Often, in practice, the discussion following the first round of voting entails
merely going around the room and counting up objectors (along with silent and pernicious assessments
of whether one or another objector ought to be "taken seriously into account"). It does not follow from
the temporary pause between the first and second vote that there will be illumination concerning the
scope of individual disagreement and thus information which will help one who struggles with the Q2
decision to make up their mind concerning whether to join with the majority to coerce the losers. The
"substantial majority" rule merely reflects a mechanism which enables, but does not ensure, deliberation
concerning the key issues raised by Q2.
One other point should be raised here. Although I have been supposing, up until now, that
knowing the views of others in the first instance is valuable insofar as it foments deliberation, we might
yet argue that even the mere fact that an individual expresses a preference is significant in evaluating
one's own view on the matter. The connection between one's own preferences and the imposition of
these preferences on individuals with a different view is a tension commonplace in democratic theory.
The related, seeming paradox noted famously by Richard Wollheim in 1962--that individuals will
accept or even, as Wollheim precisely put it, "want" an outcome supported by a majority, even in the
face of an opposite personal preference--is a conspicuous part of the enduring academic debate over
the nature and scope of democracy and democratic decision-making. 10 What is not as frequently
explored, however, is the micro-question of whether one's individual preferences ought to be shaped by
the preferences of another. This question is distinct, indeed, analytically prior, in my view, to the
question of whether one's views can be effectively shaped by persuasion developed in the crucible of
collective deliberation.
III.
If you are persuaded that there is a difference worth acknowledging in democratic theory
between the type of considerations which go into Q1 (mere preference) decisions and Q2 (preferenceas-coercion) decisions, then we have a dilemma with regard to typical voting situations. Ordinarily,
participatory democracy entails the following sequence: proposal, discussion/deliberation, vote.
Robert's Rules of Order, for example, provides for an elaborate schema of voting, yet the sequence
remains essentially "proposal-discussion-vote." This means that a member of the community who is truly

10

See Richard Wollheim, A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY (P.
Laslett & W. Runciman eds., 1962); Donald D. Weiss, Wolheim's Paradox: Survey and Solution, 1 POL. T HEORY 154
(1973).
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concerned with the preferences of others, a concern that is critical to the determination of how they will
vote on the ultimate question before them, must depend entirely upon the willingness of dissenters to
express their views. What they do not know with confidence is in fact what these individuals prefer, as
measured in an actual vote.
The most useful mechanism for discovering these preferences is the straw poll. A straw poll, by
its very nature, is designed to give information concerning the preferences of the body. Even an
anonymous straw poll gives some indication of the breadth of dissent. A straw poll, combined with prepoll and post-poll deliberation, adds a more formal element to the expressions of viewpoint in the
deliberative process. Moreover, the straw poll frees everyone in the collectivity to vote their true
preferences, holding to one side the question (i.e., Q2) of whether these preferences ought to be the
final will of the body.
In the shantytown/class move example, a straw poll would have enabled all the students to
develop a sense of how general was the support for a move to another location. This poll might have
revealed only a smattering of disagreement; presumably this would have improved the likelihood that
the class majority--or perhaps even everyone--would finally vote to move the class. In certain
circumstances, however, a straw poll might have the opposite result. For example, a poll that, by
contrast, reflected a close contest might illuminate the broad scope of disagreement and keep at bay the
second vote altogether. At the very least, the mechanism of the straw poll frames the breadth of
disagreement. In so doing, the poll enables a body to come directly to terms with the essential question
of whether there is a majority for the decision to move the class, a choice that inevitably involves the
issue of coercion and winners versus losers.
It is important to remember that straw polls suffer from the same defects of ordinary voting as
preference aggregation and decision-making. Straw polls can, of course, be subject to cycling
difficulties,11 and can be vulnerable to strategic voting. They are, in short, as flawed as any other type of
voting system in terms of reflecting true preferences and the will of the majority when faced with
multiple options. Moreover, we should note that a straw poll cannot give us information about the depth
and nature of disagreement. If we suppose that decision-making takes place with ordinary, up-or-down
voting, a discussion of some sort is required to unpack the nature and depth of disagreement.
Nevertheless, straw polls can perform the quite useful function of framing the democratic decisionmaking process as two separate questions, rather than one. In doing so, the straw poll fixes our
attention on the difficult, but important, question of whether majoritarian coercion in the interest of
pursuing the majority's preferences is appropriate.
There are further considerations, though, which also bear on the utility, and perhaps even the
advisability, of straw polls as a device for improving democratic decision-making. One key question is
whether straw polls are useful in the absence of an appropriate time for deliberation and debate.
Deliberation is essential, as previously noted, to provide further information concerning the nature and
depth of disagreement. In certain circumstances, this might be absolutely essential to the choices made
by those in the majority and in the minority. For example, the dissenter may raise a rights claim; in the
shantytown episode, it was asserted that a law student has a right to have his or her class held at the

11

See Kenneth J. Arrow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2nd ed. 1963).
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appointed time and place. A straw poll would, in the absence of deliberation, give us no basis to
evaluate this rights claim. Yet, deliberation without a straw poll would not communicate as effectively
the fact that the complaining student is doing more than simply invoking a right-- i.e., is also declaring a
preference, namely that the class be moved. Hence, the straw poll goes hand-in-hand with the space
for deliberation. In other circumstances, however, deliberation would be unnecessary. The mere fact of
substantial dissent, as measured by the straw vote, may be enough to convince a slender majority to
abandon a particular tack.
A related question is whether straw polls are useful only in connection with face-to-face
interactions. As with the deliberation issue above, much depends upon the context in which the decision
arises. It is uncommon to see straw polls deployed in situations in which a ballot is distributed by mail.
Indeed, where straw polls are utilized in those circumstances, it is usually an advisory vote that being
conducted and not a prelude to a final determination by the community members taking the poll. We
see straw polls in face-to-face settings primarily because of the nature of participatory democracy and
the need to get information about community members' preferences. We care so much about Q2
because we worry about coercion of those community members in the minority with whom we are
participating collectively. Surely it is a more difficult prospect, as any sociologist would tell us, to
disregard the will of those with whom we are participating directly and actively in a community
decision-making process. It is therefore in those circumstances in which more information relevant to
the Q2 determination is appropriate. Hence, straw polls are especially likely to be employed in these
smallish, face-to-face settings. Not surprisingly, we find this device employed in faculty meetings,
homeowners association meetings, and town hall meetings of various types; we do not see them in
large, multi-member legislatures, in initiative and referenda voting, and in mail balloting.
One last consideration to mention is the value of straw polls vis-a-vis other democratic devices
which might also be employed to uncover preferences and, therefore, illuminate Q2 decisions. For
example, we could have some sort of forced deliberation, that is, someone going around the room
asking community members to express a preference. We see this device more commonly (and perhaps
not surprisingly) in school classrooms. Interestingly, we see this device as well in jury deliberations,
where straw polls are often used along with expected declarations of preference (if we can call a juror
opinion a true "preference"). The virtue of some sort of forced deliberation is two-fold. First, it connects
the voter with a face. This is valuable to the extent that we eschew anonymity and prefer the
accountability that comes from declaring one's preference publicly (this value is, of course, very much
context-dependent). Second, it is valuable in bridging the declaration of preference with the call for
some sort of deliberation. 12 The disadvantage of forced deliberation is that it is forced; that is, it hardly
provides for the free expression of views by a self-selected group of community members who feel
strongly about the particular issue in question. In addition, it raises all the difficulties associated with
public declaration of views, which difficulties are more vexing in some settings than others. Straw polls
indicate the breadth of dissent without locating that dissent in certain individuals. Under some appealing

12

Jury deliberations provide an interesting case study. From what we know of jury deliberations, it is
typical (though certainly not universal) for jurors to be polled individually and called upon to explain themselves.
Less typically, jurors simply conduct straw polls repeatedly, bracketed by opportunities for debate and discussion,
until the appropriate consensus is reached.
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theories of participatory democracy, this person-independent explication of community sentiment is
itself valuable. Just think of the intrinsic value of anonymous applause
.
Another alternative to the straw poll is provided for expressly in Robert's Rules of Order,
namely the device of a motion to reconsider.13 According to Robert's Rules, motions to reconsider can
be made by those who voted in the majority and are designed to enable the body to reconsider its
decision. In an important sense, this motion can play the same role as a straw poll in that it can reflect
unease on the part of the winning coalition when faced with the reality of its will trumping the minority.
One reason for preferring the straw poll is that it stands between the preference vote--which can be
styled as only a preference vote--and the final vote on the proposal. Where a motion to reconsider is
contemplated, the body has already expressed its will to act and there is no particular space under
Robert's Rules of Order to have post-vote deliberation on the choice just made. Moreover, by
conflating Q1 and Q2 in the procession to a direct vote, the majority has spoken its mind as to the
outcome (preference as coercion) without any information about the true preferences of the body as a
whole. It becomes considerably messier to disentangle, from the standpoint of the "winners" who
propose the motion to reconsider, whether they have regrets because of the declared preferences of the
losers, or whether they have regrets for some other reason. In the end, then, the motion to reconsider is
conceptually equivalent to a straw poll, but with considerably less to recommend it as a means of
framing crisply the two sequential questions entailed in a decision-making process.
IV.
As this is a conference on liberalism and illiberalism, I want to comment briefly on the relationship
between voting schemes and liberalism. What straw polls as a decision-making device do is to channel
attention to the key question of whether the will of the majority should supplant minority preferences in
a particular instance. This is both consistent with and facilitative of an appealing model of liberal
democracy. Ultimately, however, the utility of straw polls depends fundamentally upon a theory of
democracy in which some individuals care about the wishes of the minority. To be sure, if taken to its
logical extreme, this "caring for" can undermine majoritarian values. The critical issue becomes one of
balance--that is, balance between fidelity to one's own views and values and one's respect for the fact
of disagreement and the views of others.14
Liberal democracy incorporates as a signal norm the idea of individual tolerance of diverse
viewpoints. One way--perhaps the principal way--in which this tolerance is made manifest is through
the creation and protection of individual rights. Yet, in many contexts, policymaking does not entail the
consideration of rights, but, instead, involves "government by reflection and choice." Where majority
will represents the decision-making method for implementing these choices, it is sensible to develop
systems for encouraging respect of the preferences of minorities in a political community. Straw polls
focus attention on these preferences and thereby facilitate respect for these different viewpoints.
This ethos of respect must be shared, however. Even supposing that citizens cast their votes in a
sincere rather than strategic manner, we would not expect that individuals would long respect the views
13

See ROBERT 'S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED 309-29 (H. Robert III & W. Evans eds., 9th ed. 1990).

14

See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
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of those on the short end of the decision-making stick, as made manifest in a straw poll, if they could
not depend upon that same sort of respect being paid to their preferences in subsequent actions. The
point here is not that logrolling will take place-- although it very well might, in certain circumstances-but, rather, that community members are usually repeat players. The value of straw polls, therefore,
rests on the assumption that there is a basic level of trust and respect, not only for the diversity of views
and preferences per se, but for the very idea, where appropriate, of deference and forbearance.
In the end, liberal democracies that practice majority rule succeed insofar as majority rule does
not become a tool for expropriation of the resources of those who will likely find themselves perennially
on the losing end of policy choices in the community. Rights protect minority interests to some extent,
but significant protection must come in the ordinary, day-to-day experience of local community politics.
This experience will involve issues that, while on the surface mundane, are the lifeblood of democratic
politics. Where there are conflicts over policy decisions and where votes measure preferences and,
ultimately, outcomes, straw polls can then perform the useful task of framing the liberal democratic
considerations at stake in the decision-making process.
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